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T
he United States experienced a rise in inﬂation from 5.5 percent in
the ﬁrst quarter of 1976 to 9.4 percent in the ﬁrst quarter of 1980.
This steep increase was followed by the desire to stem inﬂation and to
reverse its course. Therefore, soon after Paul Volcker was appointed chairman
of the Federal Reserve Board in August 1979, the Federal Reserve (the Fed)
announced new operating procedures and put in place a disinﬂationary policy.
During the implementation of that policy, two recessions came in rapid
succession. The ﬁrst began in January 1980 and lasted through the middle of
that year. Although short in duration, the recession was deep, with real GDP
falling at an annual rate of 10.4 percent in the second quarter of 1980, the largest
postwar decline on record. The second recession followed almost immediately,
beginning in July 1981 and ending in November 1982. At approximately the
same time, the Fed’s aggressive disinﬂationary policy ended. Some economists
have calculated the cost in terms of cumulative output lost to be roughly 24
percent of total output over the period 1980:1 to 1983:4.1 But during that
period, inﬂation was brought down from 10.1 percent in 1980 to 4.4 percent
in 1982.
This episode was dramatic because of both the signiﬁcant loss of output and
the equally signiﬁcant decline in inﬂation. Also, the policy of disinﬂation was
announced and was carried out over a period of three years. Thus, the episode
has the potential to shed light on a number of competing macroeconomic
theories that attempt to explain the linkage between real economic activity and
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conclusion.
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nominal disturbances. The usefulness of the 1980’s experience in this purpose
depends critically on whether the decline in inﬂation was anticipated. If the
disinﬂation was largely unexpected, even after the policy had been in place for
some time, then it will be difﬁcult to discriminate between the theories.
The ﬁrst set of theories can broadly be classiﬁed as Keynesian and are
characterized by elements of nominal rigidities in prices and wages. Specif-
ically, we have in mind models like those of Fischer (1977), Taylor (1980),
or Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988). In these models, staggered price setting
slows the adjustment of the price level to changes in the money stock. Thus,
inﬂation has inertia, and anticipated monetary contractions can precipitate a
recession by causing aggregate demand to fall. The fall in aggregate demand
will of course be greater if the disinﬂationary policy is unanticipated, since
even those ﬁrms in the process of resetting their prices will make mistakes.
Other models in which unanticipated changes in monetary policy have an
effect on real economic activity are the neoclassical monetary business-cycle
models of Lucas (1973), McCallum (1980), and Sargent and Wallace (1975). In
these models, agents partially infer nominally induced movements in prices as
being driven by real disturbances. Thus, an unanticipated fall in money causes
prices to be lower than expected, resulting in a decline in the supply of output.
If policy is anticipated, however, and there is no confusion about the impulses
driving prices, agents are not induced to supply less output. The entire effect
of policy is nominal.
Economists have varying opinions concerning the extent to which disin-
ﬂation was anticipated during the 1980-83 period, and these views partially
determine their preferred theory. For example, in discussing a number of pol-
icy changes, including the one in which we are interested, Akerlof, Rose, and
Yellen (1988) argue that
Mr. Volcker’s similar policy produced changes in equilibrium output long after
the policies were announced (and seem to be credible). The changes persisted
sufﬁciently long after their announcement that it is extraordinarily difﬁcult to
believe that the changes in employment and output they caused were due to
the slow propagation of unanticipated shocks. (P. 68)
Their view is that the Fed possessed sufﬁcient credibility, implying that the
policy change was believed either immediately or soon thereafter and hence
that the disinﬂation was largely anticipated. If that was indeed the case, then
their conclusion that the episode was more in line with Keynesian-style theories
than neoclassical ones is well taken.
The degree of Fed credibility, and hence the extent to which the disinﬂation
was anticipated, is open to question. Goodfriend (1992), in his description of
the Fed’s ﬁght against inﬂation, divides the period into three distinct parts: the
aborted ﬁght against inﬂation from October 1979 to April 1980, when short-
term interest rates rose by over 600 basis points; an easing of policy during    
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the ﬁrst recession, when rates fell by 800 basis points; and a second aggres-
sive disinﬂationary policy from August 1980 to October 1982, when rates were
eventually pushed up by 1000 basis points over their July 1980 levels. This last
sustained tightening broke the inﬂationary environment. Thus Federal Reserve
policy was far from uniform and this lack of uniformity may have impaired
the Fed’s credibility, implying that the disinﬂation could very well have been
unanticipated. Thus, how well the public anticipated the disinﬂation can help
measure the Federal Reserve’s credibility during that period.
1. DESCRIPTION OF THE 1976− −1983 PERIOD
We begin with a brief overview of the period in question, conﬁning ourselves
to a description of the behavior of inﬂation, real GDP growth, M1 growth, and
the federal funds rate (see Figures 1a to 1c). Inﬂation is measured by quarterly
changes in the GDP deﬂator and all quarterly growth rates are annualized.
As Figure 1a illustrates, the period was characterized by a run-up in in-
ﬂation from 5.5 percent in 1976:1 to 11.1 percent in 1981:1 and then by a
rapid decline to 4.09 percent in 1983:4. Associated with this rapid disinﬂation
were two recessions (Figure 1b). The ﬁrst one began in January 1980 and
was accompanied by a 10.4 percent annualized decline in real GDP during the
second quarter of that year, and the second one began in July 1981.
Figure 1a GDP Deﬂator Inﬂation: 1970 to 1986
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Figure 1b Real GDP Growth: 1970 to 1986
















In response to the increase in inﬂation, the Federal Reserve announced a
change in operating procedures in October 1979 and raised the funds rate from
11.4 percent in September to 17.6 percent in April 1980 (Figure 1c). The steep
decline in economic activity caused the Fed to temporarily back off from its
disinﬂationary policy, and the funds rate fell to 9.03 percent in July 1980. As
a result, not much headway was made in curbing inﬂation.
As the economy recovered in the fourth quarter of 1980, the Fed resumed its
policy of disinﬂation. The funds rate was raised from 10.8 percent in September
1980 to as high as 19.10 percent in June 1981. This second attempt at reversing
the inﬂationary trend in the economy was successful. The economy experienced
its second recession, but inﬂation also fell from 11.1 percent in 1981:1 to 4.4
percent in 1982:1.2
The go-stop-go nature of the Fed’s ﬁght against inﬂation is also depicted
in the growth of effective M1 against its targets. When gauging the tightness
of monetary policy by the discrepancy between money growth and monetary
targets, effective M1 is the appropriate aggregate to look at. Effective M1 is
a measure of actual M1 adjusted for the effects of deregulation and was the
2 For a much more detailed description of this period, see Goodfriend (1992).      
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Figure 1c Federal Funds Rate: 1970 to 1986




















monetary variable of primary concern to the Fed over this period.3 In 1980,
when the Fed relaxed its disinﬂationary policy, effective M1 grew at a rate of
6.9 percent, which exceeded the top of the target range by 0.4 percent. Also,
much of this growth took place in the second half of the year after policy had
eased. In 1981, however, effective M1 grew by only 2.4 percent, a full 1.1
percent below the bottom of the target range. This decline in M1 growth was
a reﬂection of the reinstitution of tight monetary policy and served to further
signal the Fed’s renewed anti-inﬂationary stance.
Thus, an examination of the two most relevant economic series for de-
picting monetary policy during the early 1980s—the funds rate and effective
M1—indicates that the ﬁght against inﬂation was somewhat discontinuous. It is,
therefore, highly possible that the credibility of the Fed’s policy was achieved
only gradually.
The discontinuous nature of policy led to renewed inﬂation in 1980 as well
as to a sharp increase in long-term bond rates relative to the funds rate—what
Goodfriend calls an “inﬂation scare”—earlier in the year. From Goodfriend’s
account, one may conclude that the Fed did not achieve credibility until the
3 For more detail on effective M1 behavior and its construction, see Broaddus and Goodfriend
(1984).           
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summer of 1982. It is thus entirely possible that although the Fed announced
its resolve to ﬁght inﬂation as early as October 1979, the policy was not fully
credible until mid-1982. Thus, it may be that much of the disinﬂation was unex-
pected and that the 1980-83 period is perfectly consistent with the neoclassical
model.
To shed further light on the degree to which the disinﬂation was antici-
pated, we adopt the innovative empirical methodology of Hamilton (1992). By
combining information in commodity futures markets with the macroeconomic
information readily available at the time, we decompose actual inﬂation into its
anticipated and unanticipated components. Our results imply that a substantial
portion of the disinﬂation was unanticipated and that the Fed suffered from a
credibility problem.
2. METHODOLOGY4
To analyze the degree to which the disinﬂation of the early 1980s was an-
ticipated, we must construct a series depicting the public’s expectations of
inﬂation. The methodology we use for constructing such a series is that of
Hamilton (1992). His procedure incorporates publicly available aggregate data
and ﬁnancial market data on commodity futures contracts to estimate price-level
expectations. The data on futures contracts are optimally weighted in an effort
to uncover information possessed by the public but not by the econometrician.
The use of future changes in commodity prices from their expected values
represents a novel way to uncover what agents believed at any given moment.
Because the change in policy was a major one, these data are potentially use-
ful for uncovering beliefs about inﬂation since ﬁnancial markets often react
aggressively to changing inﬂationary expectations.5
Speciﬁcally, suppose that the public’s expectation of next period’s price
level, pt+1, is given by
pe
t+1 = x 
tδ + αt, (1)
where the superscript e denotes an expectation, xt is a vector of all relevant
aggregate information, and αt represents information that agents ﬁnd valuable
in forecasting prices but that is unavailable to the econometrician. For example,
xt could include economic time series published by the Commerce Department
or the Federal Reserve, while αt could involve disaggregated information that
individuals observe but that is unpublished.
4 The description in this section draws heavily on Hamilton (1992), who provides a more
detailed and technically rigorous description.
5 The model does not explicitly incorporate regime changes and to some extent suffers from
the same problems as a standard VAR when regimes actually do change.        
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Let the public’s true expectational error be deﬁned by at+1 ≡ pt+1 −pe
t+1.
Note that under rational expectations at+1 is white noise and uncorrelated with
time t information. Next, consider the forecasting error, ut+1, that occurs from
the prediction of pt+1 using only the information in xt. Speciﬁcally, ut+1 is the
error term in
pt+1 = x 
tδ + ut+1, (2)
which is a typical forecasting equation. From equation (1) and the deﬁnition
of at+1, ut+1 is equal to αt + at+1. By including enough own lags of pt in xt,
ut+1 can be made white noise. A simple and consistent assumption is to treat
αt as white noise as well.
Because the variance of ut+1, σ2
u is equal to σ2
α+σ2
a, we observe that if the
econometrician uses only the information in xt to forecast pt+1, the variance
of the forecast errors will exceed that of the true forecast errors. Improving
upon these forecasts requires inferences of αt. The better the inference of αt the
closer the econometrician’s forecast will coincide with the public’s. Hamilton
proposes that data from commodities markets be used to help form an optimal
prediction of αt.
For ease of exposition, we will analyze the case in which there is one
commodity. Using data on the log of the commodity’s forward price at date t,
ft, and the log of its expected future spot price next period, Etst+1, a simple
efﬁcient markets model implies that
ft = Etst+1 − k, (3)
where k incorporates the variance of st and a constant risk premium. Equation
(3) implies that the forecast error of the spot price is observable and given by
st+1 − ft = k + vt+1, (4)
where vt+1 is the forecast error. Under rational expectations, vt+1 is uncorre-
lated with time t information. In particular, it is uncorrelated with the elements
of xt and αt. It is reasonable, however, to believe that the forecast error for
a given commodity and the aggregate price level are correlated. For example,
any demand shock (such as a monetary policy shock) could inﬂuence all prices,
including commodity prices, in a similar way. This relationship is given by
vt+1 = qaat+1 + et+1. (5)
Hence, observation of vt+1 implies some knowledge of at+1.
Next, consider a regression of the forward price on information available
to the econometrician,
ft = x 
tβ + ωt. (6)
In this regression, ωt represents information that agents ﬁnd relevant for pric-
ing a commodity and that is unavailable to the econometrician, because ft is              
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observed at time t, and if the econometrician had all the relevant information
then ωt would be zero. Thus, ωt has an interpretation similar to αt, and the two
should be related. Let this relationship be described by the linear projection
ωt = qααt + εt, (7)
where εt denotes information that agents have about future commodity price
movements that is uncorrelated with aggregate price movements.
The statistical problem is to form an optimal forecast of αt given knowledge
of ut+1, vt+1, and ωt, because it is these three observed disturbances that contain
information about αt. This optimal forecast allows us to form the expectation
of the aggregate price level that best represents the one formed by the public.
Using data on aggregate prices, commodity spot and forward prices, and xt,
construct the error terms ut+1, vt+1, and ωt according to equations (2), (4), and
(6). The optimal predictor of αt can then be formulated as



































The coefﬁcients in equation (8) are population regression coefﬁcients. The ma-
trix in (9) is the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbances ut+1 = at+1+αt.
In deriving this matrix, various orthogonality conditions implied by rational
expectations were used. The vector [σ2
α, qασ2
α,0 ]   is the covariance between
αt and the three observed disturbance terms.
The optimal forecast of next period’s price level is then depicted by
pe
t+1 = x 
tδ + A1(pt+1 − x 
tδ) + A2(ft − x 
tβ) + A3(st+1 − ft − k). (10)
In calculating the public’s expectations of next period’s price level, the econo-
metrician uses time t + 1 information from commodity spot markets. This
information is needed to extract the optimal forecast of αt, which contains
relevant information available to the public but not to the econometrician.
Unfortunately, there is one technical difﬁculty. To estimate the coefﬁcients





variance-covariance matrix in (9), however, has only ﬁve independent pieces
of information, which means that the system is not identiﬁed. An additional
restriction is needed, and we follow Hamilton by imposing qa = qα.6
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This restriction has some intuitive appeal. Suppose, for example, that the
relevant aggregate information that agents possess is a demand shock that af-
fects commodity prices and the aggregate price level in similar ways. That is,
anticipated and unanticipated movements affect st+1 and pt+1 proportionately,
although the absolute effects of an anticipated movement need not be the same
as those of an unanticipated movement. Then qa and qα should be equal.
Under the restriction qa = qα, the ratio of the covariance of ut+1 and vt+1 to
the covariance of ut+1 and ωt is equal to σ2
a/σ2
α, which reﬂects the extent that
agents are actually surprised by movements in the aggregate price level.
However, this restriction may not be valid. If, for example, the unantici-
pated disturbances that affect commodity prices are largely idiosyncratic, while
the information that agents actually possess affects both markets similarly, then
qa would not equal qα. In any event, the restriction can be tested. And with
multiple commodities, the restriction need only be placed on one commodity
to achieve identiﬁcation.
3. ESTIMATION
Before estimating the analogous multivariate system given by (1), (4), (6), and
the variance-covariance matrix in (9), we describe our commodity price data
and perform some necessary diagnostic tests. We used data on wheat, corn,
oats, and soybean futures, since these were the only commodity data available
for our sample period. In what follows, we use the price of a futures contract
that is about to expire as the measure of the spot price. Because the futures
contracts are four months in duration, the data set is three times per year (such
intervals are denoted by roman numerals).
Commodity Price Behavior
Expected and actual inﬂation rates for the four commodities are given in
Table 1. Actual inﬂation in a commodity market is calculated as the change in
the log of the spot price during the period in question, while expected inﬂation
is represented by three times the average log difference between the four-month
futures price and the spot price at each four-month interval. From the table it
is evident that expected commodity price increases greatly exceeded actual
increases during the 1981-83 period. Further, graphs of expected commodity
price inﬂation versus actual commodity price inﬂation (Figures 2a to 2d) show
that, with the exception of oats, expected inﬂation was generally higher than
actual inﬂation. These results foreshadow the main results of the statistical
model: the overestimate of commodity price inﬂation will be mirrored in an
overprediction of the aggregate inﬂation rate.
Commodity Market Efﬁciency
One of the maintained hypotheses of the model discussed in Section 2 is that
the commodity market is efﬁcient. This was depicted by equation (4) in which              
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Sources: Commodity prices were obtained from the Chicago Board of Trade Statistical Annual.
Actual inﬂation ﬁgures represent the change in the log of the spot price between September 1978
and September 1980 (upper panel) and September 1981 and September 1983 (lower panel) di-
vided by three, while the expected inﬂation ﬁgures represent three times the average log difference
between the four-month future price at time t and the spot price at time t, where t is indexed
three times per year from September 1978 to May 1980 (upper panel) and from September 1981
to May 1983 (lower panel).
the expectational error, vt+1, is normally distributed white noise. We therefore
test to determine whether vt+1 is indeed normal and whether it is correlated
with time t information. P-values for the skewness and kurtosis tests indicated
that in the cases of wheat and soybeans, we can reject normality. Furthermore,
the error terms were correlated with a menu of available time t information.
We thus cannot proceed under the assumption that equation (4) provides an
adequate description of commodity market behavior. Instead we allow for time
varying risk premiums and replace equation (4) with
st+1 − ft = x 
tκ + vt+1 (4 )
for each commodity. Upon doing so, we cannot reject the normality of vt+1 and
we also ﬁnd that vt+1 is uncorrelated with interest rates, forward commodity
prices, and its own lagged values.
Estimating and Testing the Model
Before formally estimating the model, we performed augmented Dickey-Fuller
tests on aggregate prices, spot prices, and forward commodity prices over            
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Figure 2a Expected and Actual Commodity Price Inﬂation for Wheat:
1970 to 1985


















Note: Roman numerals denote four-month intervals.
the period 1970:II to 1986:III. We could not reject nonstationarity of the price
level, but we were able to reject nonstationarity of commodity prices. Also, for
ut+1 to be white noise required the inclusion of two lags of the inﬂation rate.





















,( 1 1 )
where f and s are 4 by 1 vectors, δ i sa9b y1coefﬁcient vector, β and κ
are 9 by 4 matrices of coefﬁcients, and u, ω, and v are the disturbance terms.
The vector of explanatory variables xt includes a constant term, two seasonal
dummies (d1 and d2), two lags of the inﬂation rate, and the four commodity
spot prices.7
7 This is a fairly parsimonious statistical model. In principle, other variables such as income
or money could be included, but doing so would greatly increase the computational burden. Our
representation of the inﬂation process follows Hamilton (1992).             
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Figure 2b Expected and Actual Commodity Price Inﬂation for Corn:
1970 to 1985





















Note: Roman numerals denote four-month intervals.
























t] and S = E[ete 
t]. We estimate equations (11) and (12)
by full-information maximum-likelihood and jointly test the orthogonality
conditions assumed under rational expectations and the identifying restriction
qα = qa. We use the Sims (1980) adjusted likelihood-ratio test, which is distrib-
uted χ2(19).8 The p-value for the test statistic was 0.45, implying that we cannot
jointly reject the restrictions at standard conﬁdence levels. However, for the
system using all four commodities, there is not signiﬁcant covariation between
ωt and ut+1, and ωt and vt+1. As a result, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
qa = qα = 0.
This lack of rejection is due largely to the inclusion of wheat. Figure
2a shows that actual wheat inﬂation is volatile, especially early in the sample
8 The test statistic is 2(T−k
T ) (likelihood [unrestricted]-likelihood [restricted]).           
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Figure 2c Expected and Actual Commodity Price Inﬂation for Oats:
1970 to 1985





















Note: Roman numerals denote four-month intervals.
period. For a system containing only corn, oats, and soybeans, the covariation
between the relevant error terms is more signiﬁcant, and the hypothesis that
qa = qα = 0 can be rejected at the 9 percent signiﬁcance level. Furthermore, the
joint hypothesis involving qa = qα and the rational expectations orthogonality
conditions has a p-value of 0.66.
The estimation results for the model are displayed in Table 2. The variance
of the inﬂation forecast ut+1, σ2
u, is 0.538, most of which is due to σ2
a = 0.52.
This result implies that most of the residual, ut+1, took people by surprise.
4. PREDICTION
The predictions of inﬂation over the period 1971:I to 1986:III are calculated
using
∆pe
t+1 = x 
tδ + Et+1αt. (13)
The last term in (13) is derived from the optimal prediction formula given in
(10). Thus,          
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Figure 2d Expected and Actual Commodity Price Inﬂation for Soybeans:
1970 to 1985



















Note: Roman numerals denote four-month intervals.
∆pe
t+1 = −1.76 − 0.08d1t − 0.08d2t + 0.35∆pt + 0.14∆pt−1 (14)
−0.006sc,t − 0.012so,t + 0.018ss,t
+0.0045(pt+1 − x 
tδ)
−0.011(fc,t − x 
tβc) − 0.012(fo,t − x 
tβo)
+0.041(fs,t − x 
tβs)
−0.000041(sc,t+1 − x 
tκc) − 0.000027(so,t+1 − x 
tκo)
−0.000013(ss,t+1 − x 
tκs),
where the subscripts c, o, and s refer to corn, oats, and soybeans.
Using (14) we can decompose the forecasts of inﬂation into simple fore-
casts, x 
tδ, and the individual contributions from the price term (pt+1 − x 
tδ),
the three futures terms (ft − x 
tβ), and the three commodity market surprise
terms (st+1 −ft −x 
tκ). These decompositions are given in Table 3. Examining
the entire sample period, the contributions of the price term and the futures
term can at times be meaningful, affecting the forecasts by an annual rate as
high as 87 and 51 basis points, respectively. The commodity market surprise               
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Table 2 Estimation Results+
unrestricted log likelihood : −760.43
restricted log likelihood : −765.55
(qa = qα and orthogonality conditions imposed)
restricted log likelihood : −769.46
(qa = qα = 0 and orthogonality conditions imposed)
σ2
α = 0.017 σ2
















72.26 123.17 − 69.94















0.54 0.08 0.04 0.40 2.40 1.35 12.22
0.08 6.21 4.82 5.03 0 0 0
0.04 4.82 25.53 10.13 0 0 0
0.40 5.03 10.13 14.19 0 0 0
2.40 0 0 0 182.1 78.48 102.2
1.35 0 0 0 78.48 126.7 −38.3












+ Standard errors for the elements of q  are in parentheses. The commodities are ordered corn,
oats, and soybeans.
term, however, rarely has much effect on the forecasts, which is attributable
to the small covariance between ut+1 and vt+1. Expectations of inﬂation are
displayed in Table 4. The ﬁrst two columns give the four-month actual and
expected inﬂation rates at annualized rates, the third and fourth columns give
eight-month actual and expected inﬂation at annualized rates, and the ﬁfth and
sixth columns give the annual actual and expected inﬂation rates. The ﬁrst
expectation reported in each instance is the one that is conditional on 1979:III
information, since this is the period in which the Fed announced its disinﬂa-
tionary objectives. For example, 13.78, the ﬁrst number in column 6, is the
inﬂation rate expected for 1980 given 1979:III information.
The eight-month-ahead and the one-year-ahead forecast errors strongly im-
ply that a signiﬁcant part of the disinﬂation in the early 1980s was unanticipated.
Expected inﬂation exceeds actual inﬂation in all but three periods in the eight-
month forecasts and in every period in the one-year forecast. On average, agents          
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1970:III 1.77 1.43 0.049 0.0005 0.008
1971:I 1.00 1.38 −0.055 −0.028 0.015
1971:II 1.23 1.56 −0.047 −0.072 0.017
1971:III 0.98 1.54 −0.081 0.046 0.002
1972:I 0.97 1.25 −0.040 0.033 0.013
1972:II 1.19 1.58 −0.055 −0.11 −0.006
1972:III 1.42 1.35 0.010 0.002 −0.011
1973:I 2.77 1.44 0.19 0.17 −0.006
1973:II 2.92 3.28 −0.052 −0.009 −0.023
1973:III 3.48 3.29 0.027 −0.041 0.010
1974:I 3.77 7.84 0.13 0.046 0.004
1974:II 4.03 3.27 0.11 0.065 −0.026
1974:III 3.30 3.53 −0.033 −0.012 0.007
1975:I 1.52 3.15 −0.23 0.021 0.013
1975:II 2.79 2.04 0.11 0.071 −0.011
1975:III 2.17 1.70 0.068 −0.048 0.008
1976:I 1.07 1.80 −0.10 −0.060 −0.012
1976:II 2.11 1.27 0.12 −0.041 −0.014
1976:III 1.89 1.58 0.04 0.023 0.006
1977:I 2.52 2.11 0.060 0.049 −0.010
1977:II 1.81 2.92 −0.16 −0.014 0.032
1977:III 2.26 2.37 −0.016 −0.055 −0.002
1978:I 2.83 2.16 0.10 0.075 −0.008
1978:II 3.05 2.87 0.025 0.049 0.015
1978:III 2.96 3.16 −0.028 −0.007 0.012
1979:I 4.15 3.21 0.14 −0.047 −0.000
1979:II 4.12 3.57 0.078 −0.066 0.003
1979:III 4.73 3.91 0.12 0.072 0.004
1980:I 4.63 3.94 0.10 −0.026 0.001
1980:II 2.66 4.08 −0.20 −0.074 −0.021
1980:III 3.86 3.36 0.072 0.009 0.002
1981:I 2.83 2.73 0.013 0.005 −0.003
1981:II 3.72 2.97 0.118 −0.067 0.011
1981:III 1.39 2.64 −0.18 0.025 0.009
1982:I 1.58 2.18 −0.086 −0.039 −0.011
1982:II 1.86 1.27 0.084 −0.013 0.014
1982:III 0.20 1.57 −0.20 0.080 0.004
1983:I 1.32 1.11 0.030 −0.11 −0.010
1983:II 1.20 0.89 0.044 −0.05 0.021
1983:III 1.68 1.68 −0.001 −0.13 −0.001
1984:I 1.36 1.55 −0.027 0.003 −0.007
1984:II 1.15 1.74 −0.085 0.059 −0.005
1984:III 0.95 1.10 −0.021 0.069 0.001
1985:I 1.41 0.83 0.083 −0.066 −0.006
1985:II .084 1.13 −0.042 0.099 0.019
1985:III 1.65 1.34 0.045 0.036 −0.007
1986:I −0.82 1.22 −0.29 −0.031 0.016
1986:II 0.91 1.13 −0.031 0.11 0.015
1986:III 1.35 0.49 0.12 −0.071 −0.019
1The simple forecast is equal to x 
t ˆ δ.
2The price term is given by A1(pt+1 − x 
tδ) in equation (10).
3The futures term is given by A2(ft − x 
tβ) in equation (10).
4The surprise term is given by A3(st+1 − ft − x 
tκ).            
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Table 4 Actual and Expected Inﬂation: 1980 to 1983
One period ahead Two periods ahead One year ahead
Period
Ending Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected
1980:I 14.19 11.88
1980:II 13.89 11.88 14.04 12.87
1980:III 7.98 12.66 10.94 12.80 12.02 13.78
1981:I 11.58 10.17 9.78 13.10 11.15 13.31
1981:II 8.49 8.19 10.02 10.17 9.34 13.91
1981:III 11.16 9.18 9.83 8.88 10.40 10.67
1982:I 4.17 7.83 7.67 8.81 7.93 8.90
1982:II 4.74 6.51 4.44 8.84 6.68 9.10
1982:III 5.58 4.47 5.16 6.03 4.82 9.29
1983:I 0.60 4.59 3.09 4.17 3.64 5.93
1983:II 3.96 2.76 2.28 5.03 3.38 4.23
1983:III 3.60 3.06 3.78 2.11 2.73 5.27
Note: Roman numerals denote four-month intervals.
expected 1.03 percent and 2.23 percent more inﬂation than actually occurred
over the eight-month and one-year forecast horizons, respectively. The one-
period-ahead forecast errors do not, however, give as clear a signal. Expected
inﬂation exceeds actual inﬂation by only 27 basis points on average for the
entire period. The combination of these two results implies that the four-month
forecasts of inﬂation four months out and eight months out are drastically
overpredicting inﬂation.9 That is, even though inﬂation is declining, agents
do not seem to believe that the disinﬂationary path will continue. Essen-
tially, longer-run expectations appear to be much too static over the period.
In this sense, the econometric model indicates that much of the disinﬂationary
path was unanticipated.
5. CONCLUSION
The disinﬂation that occurred in the early 1980s was a dramatic event in post-
World War II monetary policy. Inﬂation had reached unprecedented heights
and was brought down fairly rapidly. It is likely that this disinﬂation was
partially responsible for the two recessions that occurred in rapid succession.
The disinﬂationary policy was announced and underscored by a change in
Federal Reserve operating procedures. The policy was carried out over a pro-
longed period. These two factors could easily lead to the interpretation that
9 We checked the unbiasedness of the forecasts by regressing ∆pt+1 on a constant and
Et∆pt+1. For the four-month and eight-month regressions, we could not reject a zero constant
and a unitary slope coefﬁcient. However, the hypothesis that pt+1 = Etpt+1 plus a white noise
error was rejected at the annual frequency. Therefore, we conclude that greater weight should be
placed on the eight-month forecast.    
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the disinﬂation was anticipated and, therefore, that this episode is consistent
with theories emphasizing the impact of anticipated monetary policy on real
economic activity.
Although the policy was announced, evidence documented by Goodfriend
(1992) suggests that it may not have been entirely credible. Hence the actual
disinﬂation could still have been unanticipated. Determining the extent to which
the disinﬂation was unanticipated can help ascertain the degree to which Fed
credibility was lacking.
In an attempt to resolve whether the disinﬂation was anticipated, we per-
formed a statistical analysis of the public’s expectations of inﬂation using the
methodology developed in Hamilton (1992). Our conclusion is that much of
the disinﬂation was unanticipated and that the Fed suffered from a credibility
problem. The fact that much of the disinﬂation was unanticipated, however,
does not allow us to discriminate among the competing models outlined in
the introduction. Such discrimination would necessarily involve a more subtle
hypothesis test.
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